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The question of whether private organisations can outperform public ones in 
public service delivery has been a major topic of interest over the last few 
decades. However, empirical evidence does not systematically support the 
hypothesis of lower costs and higher efficiency when private organisations 
deliver public services. To better understand the cost and efficiency 
differences of public and private organisations, we conduct a meta-
regression analysis of econometric studies relating to hospital ownership 
and performance. We analyse 61 estimations extracted from health studies 
using public versus private hospital costs and efficiency as an independent 
variable. Our analysis shows a genuine true effect in favour of public sector 
hospitals. We found evidence that public production of health services may 
be cheaper if this is provided by the public sector. However, the results show 
that when technical efficiency is considered, the private sector performs 
better than the public counterpart. And the opposite happens when instead 
of considering technical efficiency we consider financial costs. We discuss 
how the divergence in the results is affected by factors such as country, 
year, use of panel data in the study, whether performance is measured by 
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INTRODUCTION 
How does ownership influence organisational performance? Academic interest in the 
study of public and private sector differences has been justified both as a means of exporting 
the most efficient management techniques from each sector to its counterpart (Box 1999; 
Boyne 2002), and more broadly to justify the participation of private organisations in the 
provision of public services (Hodge 2000). Stiglitz recalls that the distinction between the 
public and private sectors needs to be understood by differentiating who is responsible for the 
production, provision and, finally, payment of the service (2000). The underlying logic over 
recent decades has been that allowing private organisations to participate in the provision of 
public services would increase service performance (Boyne et al. 2003; Pollitt & Bouckaert 
2011). Scholars have made multiple attempts to test this assumption and assess ownership 
effects over service performance (Boyne 1998, 2002; Hodge 2000; Bel & Warner 2008; Bel 
et al. 2010; Basu et al. 2012). However, as stated by Walker et al. (2013), empirical evidence 
regarding the performance differences of public versus private ownership remains 
ambivalent. 
One of the main reasons why these comparisons have been so challenging is the very 
conceptualisation of the term performance. Walker et al. (2010) acknowledge the 
multidimensionality of performance and the resulting operationalisation challenges when this 
has to be measured. In their view, performance includes quality, efficiency, effectiveness, 
equity, probity, and responsiveness in delivering a public service. The literature has tried to 
overcome this challenge by focusing on cost savings when comparing the two sectors. This is 
the case, for example, of the descriptive meta-analyses provided by Boyne (1998), Hirsh 
(1995), and Hodge (2000), which failed to support the hypothesis that private sector 
provision of public services is cheaper. Bel et al. (2010) were able to perform a meta-
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regression of costs and ownership for solid waste and water services at the municipal level. 
Interestingly, they did not find an empirical genuine effect of cost savings resulting from 
ownership, but did find important differences when comparing water and solid waste 
management. The authors argue that this could be explained by the degree of market 
competition. In the solid waste sector, potential for competition is relatively high, and studies 
use data on costs; on the contrary, competition is very weak in the urban water sector. The 
data available is more frequently related to technical inputs and outputs, rather than financial 
costs [data for level of competition in all sectors mentioned in this paragraph have been 
obtained from Hefetz and Warner (2012)]. Different from Bel et al. (2010), our study focuses 
only on one sector, health services, which is strongly regulated and is characterised by low 
potential for competition. But the fact that the empirical studies for this sector have used both 
financial and cost data together with technical data (and in each case, with a substantially 
large sample of studies) allows us to gain further insights to those already obtained from the 
existing literature. 
A second major argument in favour of allowing the participation of the private sector 
in the delivery of public services is that it could increase service efficiency (Andrews & 
Entwistle 2013; Haque 2001). In other words, the issue is not only whether the service is 
cheaper, but if the result of dividing the inputs and outputs is more favourable when private 
actors provide the service. The economic theory of property rights offers a possible 
explanation: while in the private sector managers and owners have a direct financial incentive 
to increase efficiency, this is not the case in public organisations where property rights are 
not linked to the employee’s salary (Andrews et al. 2011; Wamsley & Zald 1973).  
While the literature is rich in analyses considering the relation between ownership and 
service costs (Boyne 1998; Hirsh 1995; Hodge 2000; Bel et al. 2010), there is a lack of 
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empirical evidence on the effects of ownership towards efficiency. This is important as in 
highly regulated sectors costs paid by users or governments do not necessary reflect technical 
efficiency (Vickers & Yarrow 1991). Andrews et al. (2011) provide an examination of the 
overall relation between publicness and performance and conclude that the evidence towards 
the effect of ownership on service efficiency is mixed, and call for future studies to further 
examine this topic. The present study answers this call and contributes to the literature 
comparing sector differences by assessing whether there are cost and efficiency differences 
among public and private organisations when providing public services. And if so, which 
factors can explain these differences? Hence, we move beyond the conceptualisation of 
performance as simply a function of savings, and include the concept of efficiency. We do so 
by analysing the reasons why certain studies have found different results when comparing 
service costs of public versus private hospitals. The empirical evidence is provided by means 
of a meta-regression analysis of all econometric studies of health service production costs. 
We analyse 61 estimations extracted from over 16 health studies using hospital costs as a 
dependent variable. Our analysis, thus, provides an explanation of the factors that drive the 
difference in results in the empirical literature regarding the costs of delivering health 
services via public vs private organisations. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
OWNERSHIP AND COSTS 
The study of public and private sector differences has provided some compelling 
comparisons in both sectors (see, for example, the seminal work of Rainey, Backoff, & 
Levine 1976; Perry & Rainey 1988). However, defining public and private organisations has 
led to very different theoretical and epistemological approaches. The literature differentiates 
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three overarching points of view1: the generic approach, the core approach, and the 
dimensional or “publicness” approach (Bozeman & Bretschneider 1994; Scott & Falcone 
1998). 
The generic approach, acknowledges that although some differences can be found 
when comparing public and private sectors, they share a large degree of similarity when 
looking at the core dimensions of the management discipline: what managers have to do and 
how they have to do it (Murray 1975; Chandler 1991). It argues that it is not their publicness 
or privateness that affects the organisation, but rather other variables such as the 
organisational size, or the degree of centralisation and formalisation present in any given 
organisation (Scott & Falcone 1998). Because of that, the generic approach dismisses the 
classifications based on public-private differences, claiming that the notion that private sector 
organisations are mainly driven by monetary profit is too simplistic. This approach suggests 
that “management functions, organizational process, and managerial values are essentially 
identical across sectoral boundaries” (Ibid., p. 127). 
By contrast, the core approach promotes a clear distinction between public and private 
organisations, focusing mainly on the legal distinction: publicly owned versus privately 
owned. This approach can be described from an economic perspective- differentiating 
between the state and the market- or from a political perspective –emphasising the political 
influences to which public organisations are subject (Pesch 2008). In this regard, ownership 
of the property rights on residual benefits of the activity becomes a key factor that can help to 
distinguish whether the organisation is public or private (Vickers & Yarrow 1988, 1991). 
Relatedly, public choice theorists (i.e. Niskanen 1971: Tullock 1965) have suggested that 
                                                        
1 Note, for instance, that other authors have summarised five main approaches to the public 
and private distinction: generic, economist core, political core, normative, and dimensional 
(see Pesch 2008 for a full description). 
 5 
public sector organisations operate with an absence of market pressures, and this means that 
they cannot benefit from the information provided by the market as an indicator of their 
performance. Instead, they rely on political will and budgetary changes to set their production 
levels. Despite being used largely in the public administration literature, some authors have 
stated that reality seems to overcome the basic distinction offered by the core approach, as 
there is a large array of hybrid organisations that lie in between the classic public and private 
distinction (Bozeman & Bretschneider 1994). 
The third point of view, the dimensional or “publicness approach” (Bozeman 1987), 
builds upon the notion that “publicness is not a single, discrete attribute; rather, organizations 
(government, business, hybrid) are more or less public, depending on the extent to which 
externally imposed political authority affects them” (Bozeman & Bretschneider 1994). 
According to this perspective, the dichotomy of public and private ownership is not what 
differentiates organisations, but rather their interaction with a set of dimensions, such as 
funding, aim, or the final product or service provided by the organisation. One of the main 
theoretical precursors of the dimensional approach is the work by Wamsley and Zald (1973), 
which highlights the importance of considering public and private organisations as the result 
of two main variables: polity and economy. By polity, the authors refer to those activities and 
behaviours related to the development of agency purpose (such as force recruitment and 
socialisation, or monitoring the environment); while economy describes those actions that 
would help to effectively accomplish a particular task (such as resource allocation, or 
division of work). Accordingly, publicness is then seen as a continuum rather than a 
dichotomy (Bozeman 1987). 
In an attempt to test the three approaches, Scott and Falcone (1998) verified their 
explanatory capacity and concluded that even though all of these can be adequate to explain 
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some organisational characteristics, the core approach and dimensional approach have a 
higher explanatory power than the generic approach. Their empirical evidence supports the 
idea that public and private organisations are different and, as the authors claim, justifies its 
study in relation to service performance (Scott & Falcone 1998). 
Hence, given the long-standing discussion on the differences between public and 
private organisations, it is not surprising that several authors have focused on the study of 
whether public organisations can outperform their private counterparts, and vice versa 
(Andrews et al. 2011). As far as we know, the first empirical multivariate tests comparing 
public versus private organisations in public services was offered by Hirsch (1965) in the 
solid waste collection field, for which he did not find significant cost differences between 
public and private production. The model proposed by Hirsch (1965) was, with small 
modifications, followed in consequent studies by Kitchen (1976) in Canada, Kemper and 
Quigley (1976) and Collins and Downes (1977) in the USA, and Pommerehne and Frey 
(1977) in Switzerland. Except for the study by Collins and Downes (1977), all reported that 
private organisations outperformed their public counterparts. In a similar vein, Mann and 
Mikesell (1976) provide a multivariate empirical study comparing public and private 
performance in the water distribution sector, and found public production to be more 
efficient.  
Interestingly, several years after these initial studies, two review studies [one a literary 
review (Bel & Warner 2008) and the other a meta-regression analysis (Bel et al. 2010)] 
assessed ownership effects on water and solid waste production. These authors found no 
systematic support for lower costs with private production; instead, they argue that 
performance differences are explained by the time period of the analysis, and contextual 
factors such as service characteristics and policy environment. In the same vein, Carvalho et 
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al. (2012) conducted a meta-regression comparing scale and scope economies between public 
and private production of public services. Furthermore, a recent comprehensive systematic 
review of the evidence of international literature on contracting out in technical and social 
services found no evidence of differing costs between public and private providers of social 
services, including healthcare (Petersen et al. 2018). 
The differences stated above indicate that ownership does not have a clear effect over 
performance. Instead, as Andrews et al. (2012) warn, it is very much context dependent and 
should therefore be studied within a single service. With this in mind, the next section 
addresses the issue of public versus private performance in a particular service: public and 
private hospitals. 
Assessing Public and Private Performance in the Health Sector 
Over the last few decades, numerous studies have analysed performance differences in the 
healthcare sector among public and private hospitals. Campbell (1990) offered one of the 
most seminal works that began to address this research line. In her study of 224 US hospitals, 
she found that publicly-owned hospitals were significantly less efficient than those that were 
privately owned. A subsequent study by Chirikos and Sear (1994), again analysing US 
hospitals, refined the empirical approach by providing a DEA analysis that could account for 
six years of data (1982-1988). When comparing public versus private hospital performance, 
the authors found that private hospitals had a slightly higher technical efficiency. They argue 
that the net efficiency advantage of for-profit hospitals is very small and at the borderline of 
statistical significance (p = .06). Their results have been supported by other studies of US 
hospitals, showing public hospitals as being more inefficient than those that are for-profit 
(Vitaliano & Toren 1996). 
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Fournier and Mitchell (1997) claimed that ownership has little effect on performance. 
According to their results, what seems to have a strong effect on hospital efficiency is not its 
public or private status, but whether it is part of a large group of hospitals -what they call a 
multiservice system. Despite the initial agreement that public hospitals could be less efficient 
than those privately-owned, as more authors analysed the topic, different results began to 
emerge. Rosko (1999) provides a study with a very large n (3,262) of US hospitals. 
Challenging previous results, he found that for-profit hospitals tend to be less efficient than 
public ones. The author argues that this can be explained by the desire of private hospital 
directors to focus on value leadership, meaning the focus is on providing the best possible 
services regardless of cost (Ibid.). Far from showing a clear pattern, one of the latest studies 
of US hospital performance that included ownership as an explanatory variable again showed 
a very different picture. Using a stochastic frontier model of hospital technical efficiency, 
Brown (2003) reports higher inefficiencies within public versus private. 
Although the literature on this topic is very heavily dominated by US studies, there 
have been a few attempts to address this issue in other national contexts. Other authors have 
also addressed the performance differences of public and private hospitals in other countries. 
Bosmans and Fecher (1995), for instance, provide a cross-sector analysis of Belgian 
hospitals. Interestingly, they found publicly-owned hospitals to be on average more efficient 
than their private counterparts. Two further studies have analysed European hospitals to 
disentangle the relationship between ownership and performance, finding different results. 
Herr’s (2008) study of German hospitals provided empirical evidence suggesting that 
publicly-owned organisations are more efficient than those owned privately. However, a few 
years later, she developed a second study (also in Germany) which reported no significant 
differences in cost efficiency among public and privately-owned hospitals, but did show a 
higher profit efficiency in private hospitals (Herr et al. 2011). This research issue has also 
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been explored in the Asian context; this is the case, for example, in the study of Taiwanese 
hospitals developed by Lin et al. (2005). By analysing data from the Taiwan National Health 
Insurance Research, these authors conclude that publicly-owned hospitals experience higher 
costs per patient than those owned privately.  
Interestingly, two meta-reviews focusing on ownership and performance obtained the 
opposite results despite being developed by the very same authors. Shen et al. (2007) 
reviewed those papers linking ownership and performance for the period between 1990 and 
2004. In their results, the authors explain that ownership had a strong influence on 
performance, although they did not find that private hospitals performed better than their 
public counterparts. Furthermore, a comprehensive review conducted by the Australian 
Government Productivity Commission found no differences in costs between public and 
private hospitals (Productivity Commission 2009). 
In a nutshell, there is a wide array of studies dedicated to the study of the relationship 
between ownership and hospital performance; however, their evidence points to mixed 
results, suggesting that it is not clear within the current literature how ownership influences 
performance. We argue that one of the reasons why the literature on organisational 
performance offers mixed results is the very definition of organisational performance. In this 
study, organisational performance considers both the costs that the service passes to the user, 
not for the organisation producing the service, and the efficiency of the hospital, which 
reflects the production costs of a particular service. 
Theoretical Expectations 
Nowadays there is no empirical consensus on whether publicly produced services perform 
better than private ones. A rather large number of studies find that private outperforms 
public, but there is a considerable number that report the opposite (see, for a review, Bel et al. 
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2010). Hence, we cannot provide an a priory proposition of whether the public sector will 
have lower or higher costs than its private counterparts when delivering health services. 
The industrial organisation literature suggests considering the role of technical 
efficiency when analysing public and private delivery of public services. From this 
perspective, private service delivery should have lower costs as a result of the high 
management restrictions faced by public managers. In their seminal study of privatisation in 
the UK, Kay and Thomas (1986) argue that the main reason why it would be expected for 
private sector organisations to outperform their public counterparts is due to “the constraints 
and opportunities with which that management is faced” (Kay & Thomas 1986, p. 19). These 
authors state that with high regulation or lack of market competition this difference among 
public and private tends to diminish, because the private sector no longer can benefit from its 
managerial room of manoeuvre. In this line, Bel et al. (2010) draw on property rights theory 
to state that “ownership is an important factor because it confers the right to obtain the 
benefits from actions related to the assets, such as profit, as well as the benefits from 
innovation and efficiency gains. Bureaucrats have control rights under public ownership, but 
they do not enjoy property rights and thus cannot directly benefit from the profits generated 
by cost reduction” (Bel et al. 2010, p. 556).  
Hence, from these theoretical perspectives we would expect that when technical 
efficiency is considered in the public vs private service delivery comparison, the private 
sector will tend to show better results than its public counterpart. 
A second major issue when considering organisational performance is the concept of 
allocative efficiency. This refers to how the user can benefit from service efficiency. When 
cost is highly regulated by the government the user may not even notice the effects of an 
increase in efficiency. The service costs faced by the service user rarely reflect the real costs 
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incurred by the organisation producing it. Hence, while competitive markets tend to force the 
private sector to search for allocative efficiency (Kay & Thomas 1986), this may not be the 
case when a private organisation is producing a public service in a sector with low levels of 
competition and tight regulation. The reason for this is that the price of the service is decided 
by the contract with government. Thus, there is no incentive to transfer the increases in 
efficiency onto the user. Allocative efficiency is reflected in the financial costs of the service. 
This explains why in those cases in which private sector organisations have directly 
competed with public ones, such as in the American electric utilities field (Pescatrice & 
Trapani 1980) or German insurance companies in the 80s (Finsinger & Pauly 1985), studies 
have shown how the costs of the privately-owned organisations were significantly higher 
than those that were publicly-owned. Accordingly, the consideration of financial costs in the 
public vs private comparison should tend to favour the public sector to the detriment of their 
private counterpart. 
A third and final variable that seems of particular importance when considering cost 
differences in service delivery is whether private not-for-profit organisations have been 
considered in the public vs private analysis. Not-for-profit organisations, instead of being 
owned by a group of shareholders or investors, are member-based institutions (Rosenau & 
Linder 2003). In practice, this means that they can belong to non-governmental organisations, 
specific communities or, in the case of hospitals, religious organisations and health 
authorities (Herrera et al. 2014). A major difference when compared to for-profit private 
organisations is that they do not distribute surplus to those who control the organisation; 
instead, this is either reinvested in the organisation or used to found other related institutions 
or projects. Arguably then, while for-profit organisations seek a high economic return when 
delivering a service, not-for-profit organisations intend to maintain economic sustainability to 
deliver the service (Gray 1986). From a theoretical point of view, it should be expected that 
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not-for-profit organisations delivering public services will present higher costs than their for-
profit counterparts, as they do not have incentives to increase their economic benefits. Hence, 
when comparing public vs private service production, the inclusion of private organisations 
that are not-for-profit should diminish the cost differences between the public and private 
sector. 
Summing up, the four main propositions derived from our theoretical expectations are: 
(1) We cannot provide a proposal for whether differences exist in terms of costs when 
comparing public versus private service delivery; (2) When technical efficiency is considered 
in the public vs private service delivery comparison, the private sector will tend to show 
better results (in comparison with the public sector) than when financial costs are considered. 
On the contrary, in this last case, the public sector will tend to show better (in comparison 
with the private sector) than when technical efficiency is considered; and (4) Studies that 
differentiate between private for-profit and private not-for-profit hospitals will find higher 
costs differences between public and private sector organisations. 
THE META-SAMPLE 
Table 1 provides the 21 studies used in the analysis, their number of estimators, and the 
number of observations each study contributes to the sample, country, and method. The final 
number of observations included in the analysis is 80. The studies we use in the analysis have 
been conducted for the USA, Germany, Taiwan, Belgium, Spain, and Italy. The final sample 
of studies included in the meta-regression analysis is the result of several review stages, 
following standard procedures in meta-regression studies (see, for example, Bel & Gradus 
2016). The initial stage consisted of the identification of studies of interest by reviewing 
papers published in the fields of Public Administration, Public Policy, Economics, and 
Health. To identify potentially suitable studies, we used a combination of the key words 
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“hospital performance” or “hospital efficiency”, and “ownership”, “public” or “private” and 
searched for them in the publication abstracts. These journals were reviewed by analysing 
multiple databases, such as Science Direct, Pubmed, Proquest, and JStor. 
In addition, we also reviewed unpublished works available in large working paper 
collections, such as EconLit, Social Science Network, and Repec-Ideas. Finally, this was 
completed by collecting papers from databases specialising in PhD theses, including 
OpenGrey, European Science Research Council (ESRC), E Thesis Online Service (ETHOS), 
US GAO, and The National Technical Information Service (NTIS). Arguably, at the end of 
this stage we had identified all those studies examining how ownership influences hospital 
performance. The database was built by the authors and the methodology is based on the 
MAER reporting guidelines in Stanley et al. (2013). The final search was concluded on July 
27th of 2018 and returned a total number of 19,303 results. 
-- Inster Table 1 about here -- 
After the first search, we look at each of the studies to identify which would be 
potentially suitable to build our database. We initially found 31 studies that seemed to be 
suitable to enter our meta-regression. The third and final stage consisted of carefully coding 
each identified paper to determine whether the author/s were empirically addressing 
ownership effects on hospital performance; this was achieved by distinguishing between 
public and private sectors, and the definition of hospital performance being used in each 
study. A fundamental characteristic of meta-regression studies is that the dependent variables 
of selected studies need to be very homogeneous to be compared; hence, we decided to 
exclude those articles that presented dependent variables that we consider to be too different 
to those included in the final sample, such as the performance of mental hospitals or dental 
care activities (i.e. Andersen  Blegvad 2006; Jensen et al. 2009). Other studies were excluded 
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because they did not strictly compare public and private management, according to how the 
reference categories in their estimations were chosen (i.e. Thorpe et al. 2001; Lien et al. 
2008; Czypionka et al. 2014; Cavallieri et al. 2018; Cho & Hong 2018). Similarly, in some 
cases studies had to be dropped because their authors did not provide sufficient statistical 
information for us to include them in the final database. Thus, those publications that did not 
provide information regarding the T-statistics or tandard errors (or the p-values) of their 
regressions could not be included in this study, as we did not have any possibility to compute 
the T-statistic (i.e. Goes & Zhan 1995; Ferrier & Valdmanis 1996; Connor, Feldman & Dowd 
1998). In all, 10 studies were excluded. 
THE META-REGRESSION 
Our final sample is derived from the 21 studies identified as containing homogeneous 
estimates of the performance of private relative to public production of hospital services. 
These studies include a total of 96 estimations of hospital performance according to the 
production form. Of these 96 estimations, we can use the 80 that include all variables 
considered in our analysis, as well as the homogeneous definition of the production form 
variable, which allow us to obtain a t-value for the comparison between public and private 
production.  
There are many reasons why t-values for the comparison between public and private 
production vary in empirical studies. Three categories of factors are suggested in Stanley and 
Jarrell (1989): (1) the fact that the data set employed in each study is unique; (2) model 
specification may induce biases; and (3) the statistical methods employed are different. We 
undertake a meta-regression analysis to explain diversity and the pattern of findings in the 
empirical studies. When constructing our data sample, we kept Stanley and Jarrell’s (1989) 
points in mind. We provide some technical details on the structure of the meta-regression 
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model and the rationale to use t-values instead of coefficients as the dependent variable in the 
meta-regression. 
Most studies included in our sample use data on hospital costs to compare financial 
performance of public and private hospitals. In several cases, data used is on the technical 
efficiency of public and private hospitals (i.e. Chirikos & Sear 1994; Sari 2003; Brown 2003; 
Tiemann & Schreyögg 2009). Whenever needed, we have transformed the T-statistics to 
ensure homogeneity and robustness of the dependent variable in our meta-regression 
estimation (i.e. Chirikos & Sear 1994). 
We define several moderator variables for the database. First, we include a continuous 
variable, YearData, which reflects the year to which the data used in the study belongs (we 
take the average year when data was obtained for several years), to consider the possible 
existence of time trends affecting the comparative performance between public and private 
organisations. Using this moderator is usual in meta-regression analysis because it is intended 
to consider potential time effects. Some privatisation articles have observed that older studies 
tend to give higher performance ranking to public services provided by privately owned 
organisations, but this performance gap has been attenuated over the last few years (Bel et al.  
2010). 
Second, we include a set of moderator variables related to the characteristics of the 
model specification in each study. The second variable is the dummy variable, panel, which 
takes the value of one if a panel estimation method was used, and zero otherwise. This is 
intended to consider that panel estimations are richer in data and usually more robust than 
cross-section estimations. The third variable is the dummy variable Individual, which takes 
value one if the data collection took place at the individual (patient) level, and zero if the data 
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collection took place at organisational (hospital) level. This variable allows us to control for 
potential differences between microdata and organisational data. 
Next, we include variables related to the exogenous characteristics of the study. Our 
fourth variable is a dummy variable, USA, which takes value one if the study was conducted 
in the USA, and zero otherwise; in this way, we consider that the USA does not have a 
universal system of health service provision as is the case for all other countries for which 
studies in the data sample have been conducted. Interestingly, there is some empirical 
evidence showing that the US has incurred higher costs when delivering health services than 
a comparable country with universal provision such as Canada (Woolhandler et al. 2003). 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that 65% of the studies in our meta-regression have been 
conducted for the US, so this variable helps to control for this fact. And we also include a 
dummy variable for Germany, which takes value one for Germany and zero otherwise, 
because four studies conducted with data from German hospitals provide more than 40% of 
the estimations we have been able to use. Together with this dummy, we use estimation 
techniques that expressly address the problem of correlation across observations.  
Finally, we include our main independent variables. Our sixth variable is the dummy 
Not-for-profit (NFP), which takes value one for those estimations where NFP were included, 
besides purely public and purely privately-managed hospitals, and zero otherwise. Our last 
variable is the dummy variable, Cost, which takes value one if the dependent variable in the 
estimation was cost-related, and value zero otherwise (generally in that case, technical 
efficiency-related indicators that considers which inputs are necessary to obtain a certain 
output). It is important to recall that costs and technical efficiency are not strictly related in 
weakly competitive and heavily regulated sectors, such as this one. As a result, it is possible 
that productive units can at the same time be more efficient and charge higher costs for 
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services (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988, 1991), as has been found in studies for public and private 
delivery of public services like solid waste collection (Bel & Miralles 2010). Because we 
have both types of dependent variable in the original estimations, and sometimes these 
present the opposite sign to indicate superior performance, we were careful in making signs 
homogeneous so that our meta-regression estimates are robust.  
Table 2 summarises the dependent and independent variables used in this study, while 
table 3 depicts the descriptive statistics of these variables and the dependent variable in our 
meta-regression, and the variables used in the meta-regression tests. 
-- Insert Table 2 about here – 
-- Insert Table 3 about here -- 
In the meta-regression tests, in order to differentiate the true empirical effect from 
publication bias we also use the reported standard error and t-statistics associated with the 
coefficient of the variable indicating production form in the regression equations, and the 
degrees of freedom. Note that this information is not available in all of the studies. Whenever 
the t-statistics are given, the derivation of the standard error is a straightforward task. Degrees 
of freedom are given in the original studies or can be calculated from the descriptive data 
within the studies (i.e. by subtracting the number of regressors from the sample size). Finally, 
we have 80 observations for SE and their t-statistics. 
The equation with which we estimate the influence of different study characteristics on 
the comparison between public and private performance can be stated as follows: 
Ti= α0 + α1 YearData i+ α2 Panel i + α3 Individual i + α4 USA i + α5 Germany i + α6 NFP i + 
α7 PCost i + ε i                                                                                                                                                                                        
(1)   
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where Ti is the t-value reported in each estimation for the coefficient of the production form. 
We have homogenised, when needed, the signs (according to the different specifications in 
the original models), and the higher the value the higher the cost (the lower the efficiency) of 
private production. The moderator variables are as defined in the previous section (see also 
Table 2). We tested formally for the presence of multicollinearity and obtained a mean value 
of 2.78 for the variance inflation factor (VIF). All coefficients were below 6, indicating that 
multicollinearity should not be a problem for the interpretation of the regression results 
(Damanpour & Schneider 2009; Hair et al. 2006). 
RESULTS 
We estimated different meta-regression models to obtain robust results. First, we estimated 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. We tested for heteroscedasticity and did not 
reject the hypothesis of constant variance, as we found that the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test has a value of 0.10 for the chi-square statistic, with a p-value of 0.318. In 
addition, we include a robust OLS estimation to check the stability of our results. Results for 
both estimations are presented in table 4. 
Our sample is formed with observations obtained from 21 studies, each containing a 
different number of estimations, which can lead to the problem of dependence across 
observations (Nelson & Kennedy 2009; Ringquist 2013). There may exist other potential 
sources of dependence across observations. A main one would be the use of common data 
sets in different studies – for example, as happens with the use of ICMA data in articles 
assessing the choice of production modes of local public services in the US. In this regard, it 
is worth noting that we do not have this problem in our analysis, as each database is unique to 
the study in which it was used. A second source of dependence across observations would be 
the fact that different studies may have been undertaken by the same research teams. In our 
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sample, two studies conducted for Germany were carried out by the same scholars. However, 
as we included a variable to control for studies conducted in Germany, this should not be a 
problem in our analysis. 
To take full account of within-study autocorrelation, we followed the suggestion of 
Ringquist (2013, p. 218) and used generalised estimating equations (GEE) to estimate a 
random effects meta-regression model. By doing so, we cluster all estimations of each study 
to deal with dependence across observations. Another possible way of dealing with intra-
study variability is to calculate a single average effect size from each original study, or select 
the best estimation from among all estimations in a single study. We disregarded both 
because that would result in an extremely small sample (16 estimations) for our meta-
analysis, as warned by Nelson and Kennedy (2009), and – as suggested in Ringqvist (2013) - 
that would have implied discarding a large amount of information. It is worth noting that our 
robust GEE coefficients and signs are almost identical to those obtained when using a FGLS 
regression, and the Wald chi-squared statistics obtained with GEE and FGLS are similar, as 
can be seen in table 4, which shows the results from the estimation of the meta-regression 
equation (1). 
-- Insert Table 4 about here -- 
 
Regarding the variable indicating potential time effects, all estimations show no 
significance for YearData, suggesting that the time for which the study was conducted does 
not affect the performance comparison between public and private production. Likewise, the 
variable Individual does not appear to be significant regarding the relative performance. On 
the contrary, the studies that use panel estimation -that is, the more robust studies- tend to 
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find better performance under public production, as indicated by the positive and highly 
significant (always at the one per cent level) sign for the variable Panel. 
With respect to countries for which the study was conducted, all estimations show 
significance at the 5% level for the US for better performance in public production, with the 
exception of the OLS robust. Recall in this regard that our heteroscedasticity test suggests 
more robust results from OLS and GEE/GLS. In the same vein, the studies conducted for 
Germany tend to find a highly significant (always at the one per cent level, but OLS robust) 
better performance in public production, since private production appears to be associated 
with higher costs. We are not aware of specific data on cross-country differences in 
efficiency and productivity in the Health sector, which would indeed be useful to better 
understand these results. However, a possible explanation for these results can be found in 
looking at the overall performance levels of the public sector for each country, available at 
the Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum), which evaluates and compares 
countries on (among many other issues) '(1.08) Efficiency of Government Spending' and 
'(1.09) Burden of Government Regulation'. In the last report published (2017-2018), 
Germany and the US rank similarly in both aspects, and are identified among the best 
countries in the world. On the contrary, Taiwan, and particularly Belgium, Spain, and Italy 
(the four remaining countries in our meta-regression) rank much worse on both factors. So, 
when our results show that the public sector in health in Germany and the US compares more 
favourably to the private sector than in the remaining countries in our study, this is consistent 
with comparative data available on the efficiency of the public sector overall for the countries 
included in our study. 
Turning to the moderator variables related to theoretical insights, including not-for-
profit management in the study does not have any significant relationship with the relative 
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performance of production forms, as Not-for-Profit coefficients do not have statistical 
significance. Instead, we find that studies that use financial data to analyse costs tend to find 
better performance within public production, as the sign for the variable Cost is positive and 
highly significant (always at the one per cent level).  
Thus, overall, the meta-regression gives a strong indication that studies conducted for 
the USA and Germany - that use financial data and conduct panel estimation - provide better 
performance for public production.  
Our meta-regression includes two articles (Augurzki et al. 2012, and Langaber et al. 
2018) that analyse the effect of the production form on the probability of the hospital’s 
financial default. As this might be not enough homogeneity with the dependent variables in 
the other 19 studies considered, we want to check the stability of our results. In this way, we 
have excluded these two articles, and have again obtained OLS, GEE and GLS estimates, this 
time with 19 studies including 76 raw estimations. The results are identical - signs and 
significance - for all variables in the model. These results are available upon request. 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
A major concern of any meta-regression model is the identification of any potential 
publication bias. Studies finding statistically significant relationships between the variables of 
interest are arguably more likely to be published in top academic outlets, which may lead to 
incorrect conclusions regarding the effectiveness of a hospital ownership type. A priori, we 
do not believe publication bias should be a serious problem in our analysis, mainly because 
there is no unanimously-established theoretical view on the relative performance between 
public and private production in the management of health services. Indeed, the studies 
analysed here typically deal with the dimension of the effect, rather than the existence of the 
effect itself.  
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Nonetheless, as publication bias could upwardly bias the effectiveness of the 
organisation’s ownership, we believe it is important to deal with this potential problem. To 
identify and correct for possible publication bias, Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) propose 
the funnel asymmetry tests (FATs). These tests estimate the relationship between a study’s 
reported t-statistics on the one hand, and SE of its coefficients and Sample Size of the 
estimation on the other. Consequently, we estimate the following equations: 
𝑇𝑖  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝑆𝐸𝑖
) +  𝜀𝑖 ,             (2) 
𝑇𝑖  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑄𝑅_𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒i +  𝜀𝑖                                                   (3) 
 
where T is a study’s reported t-statistic, 1/SE is the inverse of the standard error 
(Inverse_StandardErrors), and SQR_SampleSize is the Square Root of the sample size. 
Evidence for publication bias will be found when 𝛽0 ≠ 0. Equations (2) and (3) are estimated 
in table 5.  
Additionally, in line with Stanley (2008), to test the true empirical effect we also 
conduct a meta-significance test (MST) by estimating the following equation:       
log |𝑇𝑖|  =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1log(𝑑𝑓𝑖) +  𝜀𝑖,           (4) 
where df are the degrees of freedom of the estimate reported [and log(df) is the logarithm of 
degrees of freedom]. The MST is based on the statistical property that the dimension of the t-
statistic will vary systematically with the degrees of freedom if there is a genuine empirical 
effect (Stanley 2008). Therefore, Stanley (Ibid.) argues that if γ1 = 0 the true effect is 
disputable. These results are included in Table 5. 
 
-- Insert Table 5 about here -- 
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It is important to note that the FAT estimates the relationship between a study’s 
reported effect and its coefficients’ standard errors, or sample size. Hence, evidence of 
publication bias is found when the intercept is significantly different from zero (Ibid.). The 
results of our FAT, presented in table 5, do not reject the hypothesis of no publication bias 
because the intercept is not statistically different from zero in any case.  
We do not initially find evidence of the existence of a ‘true’ effect or genuine 
empirical effect in the FAT. However, the results of the MST show that the coefficient of 
Logdf is positive and highly statistically significant, which would indicate better performance 
with public production. Therefore, performance seems to be better in public hospitals 
according to the result of the MST, although some caution is needed because no true effect 
was obtained from the FAT. 
CONCLUSION  
Research comparing performance among public and private organisations has generated 
robust findings over the last few decades. Despite this, the results of this meta-regression 
offer some important insights for those interested in the costs and efficiency of public and 
private hospitals. First, those studies analysing German hospitals do find that private 
hospitals perform worse than their public counterparts; German hospitals tend to be more 
associated with better public performance when compared with studies elsewhere. Second, 
research using panel data approaches more frequently find that public hospitals outperform 
private ones. Arguably, when more robust methodologies are applied, such as panel data 
approaches, the results present a more favourable performance in terms of costs for public 
hospitals than when they rely on cross-sectional analysis. Third, using financial cost data in 
the studies tends to be associated with better performance by public hospitals. Finally, 
including not-for-profit hospitals when analysing public and private sector differences does 
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not seem to produce any effect. So, when we distinguish between private for-profit, and 
private not-for-profit in the public and private comparison, the results do not change. 
Our results from the FATs estimations do not allow us to claim a true empirical effect 
of ownership over costs and efficiency, meaning that systematic differences do not exist 
between public and private production. However, it is worth noting that our MST suggests 
that public hospitals outperform private ones. Future research is needed to better understand 
if, when controlling for contextual and organisational variables, ownership has a true effect 
over organisational performance. In this sense, it is important to highlight that the present 
study is limited by the number of estimators contained in the literature on hospital 
performance. A common critique for meta-regression studies is that it does not allow for a 
fine comparison of how each dependent and independent variable of those studies included in 
the sample are measured (Borestein et al. 2009). While we have prioritised the use of similar 
measures over the n of our sample, future studies should also look at other performance 
information to enrich the knowledge on the effects of ownership over organisational outputs 
and outcomes. 
To conclude, the evidence provided by this meta-regression lends some empirical 
support for the dimensional or “publicness approach” referred to by Bozeman and 
Bretschneider (1994), as it shows that the distinction between public and private does not 
explain clear performance differences per se; instead, we must consider a large array of 
environmental and organisational characteristics that could help us to understand the reasons 
behind performance differences across sectors. More than two decades ago, Perry and Rainey 
(1988) warned that the tendency in articles that address the public and private differentiation 
was to represent the distinction by a categorical variable of either public or private. After 
their revision of the literature, these authors propose a classification of the organisation type 
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according to the cross-classification of three variables: ownership, funding, and mode of 
social control. However, despite this classification attempt, most, if not all, research 
comparing public and private organisations has relied upon ownership to distinguish between 
public and private entities (Bozeman 1987; Perry & Rainey 1988; Boyne 2002). In this line, 
our analysis demonstrates that the comparison between public and private performance 
requires a broader theoretical framing that includes several moderating factors. Only by 
developing further research on these moderators of ownership and organisational 
performance will we be able to distinguish when and how private organisations could be a 
better option for the delivery of health services. 
APPENDIX 
The standard econometric model has the following structure: 
 
𝑌 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀 (A.1) 
 
This allows for an explanation of the determinants of an event, and their magnitude 
and relevance. Now, in order to explain reported differences Jarrell and Stanley (1989) 
propose the following structure for a model to synthesise the various findings: 
𝐾 






Where 𝑏𝑗 (observed dependent variable) is the reported coefficient of the true effect - β from 
the 𝑗th study out of the set of estimations from the studies included in the data base. The right 
side of the equation displays the “meta-part”. 𝛼𝑘 stands for the meta-regression coefficients, 
𝑍𝑗𝑘 for meta-independent variables that capture systematic differences between observations, 
and 𝑒𝑗 is the meta-regression disturbance term. In practice, for 𝑏𝑗, it is customary to use the 
ratio between the coefficient and the standard error (the t-value) rather than the reported 
coefficients. The main reason for this is that in studies using different data sets, sample sizes 
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and specifications, the variances of the coefficients will tend to be different, which can make 
the meta-regression errors heteroscedastic. 
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Table 1. Main characteristics-multivariate studies on performance comparison between 







Sample Country Method* 
Campbell (1990) 3 1986 224 USA OLS 
Chirikos & Sear (1994) 3 1989 189 USA OLS 
Bosmans & Fecher (1995) 1 1991 150 Belgium OLS 
Vitaliano & Toren (1996)  1 1991 219 USA OLS 
Fournier & Mitchell (1997) 1 1984-1986 534 USA SUR 
Carey (1997) 5 1987-1991 1733 USA OLS 
Rosko (1999) 3 1994 3262 USA OLS 
Kessler & McLellan (2002) 1 1985-1996 1661674 USA OLS 
Brown (2003) 5 1992-1996 1907 USA OLS 
Sari (2003) 5 1994-1998 876 USA OLS & Panel 
Rosko (2004) 2 1990-1999 407 USA Panel 
Lin et al. (2005) 1 1997-2001 139630 Taiwan OLS 
Jiang (2006) 2 1997-2001 1369 USA Logistic 
Herr (2008) 10 2001-2003 1665 Germany OLS & Panel 
Tiemann & Schreyögg (2009) 11 2002-2006 4902 Germany Panel 
Fageda & Fiz (2011) 2 1997 & 2007 1275 Spain OLS 
Herr, Schmitz & Augurzky 
(2011) 
10 2002-2006 1579 Germany OLS 
Augurzki et al (2012) 3 2001-2005 962 Germany OLS & PANEL 
Ding (2014) 8 2003 50916 USA OLS 
Guerrini et al (2017) 2 2011-2012 142 Italy Tobit & OLS 
Langaber et al (2018) 1 2012-2015 1240 USA OLS 




Table 2. Definition of variables 
 
Dependent variable 





Continuous variable that reflects the year(s) for which the data 
was obtained   
Panel Dummy with one if the study used panel estimation method   
Individual Dummy with one if data is obtained for patients  
USA Dummy with one if the study was conducted in USA 
 Germany Dummy with one if the study was conducted in Germany 
 Not-For-Profit Dummy with one if the study included Not-For-Profit hospitals  
 Cost Dummy with one if the study measured financial costs  
  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of variables used in meta-regression analysis and meta-
regression tests 
   Average    SD    Max   Min   Nº 
t-Statistic 0.94 8.43 39.77 -38.40 80 
Year Data 1999.08 6.54 2015 1984 80 
Panel 0.35 0.48 1.00 0.00 80 
Individual 0.01 0.11 1.00 0.00 80 
USA 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 80 
Germany 0.43 0.50 1.00 0.00 80 
Not-for-Profit 0.70 0.46 1.00 0.00 80 
Cost 0.63 0.49 1.00 0.00 80 
Standard error  2.82 19.99 178.98 0.00 80 




Table 4. Meta-regression estimates (OLS, Robust OLS, GEE, and GLS) 
 
 OLS OLS GEE  FGLS 
































































N 80 80 80 80 
F 7.96*** 3.90***   
R2 0.4363 0.4363   
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test (p>chi2) 
0.318    
VIF 2.78    
Wald(chi)2   46.82 61.92 
Prob > chi2   0.000*** 0.000*** 
Level of significance: *=10 per cent; **=5 per cent; ***=1 per cent 
 




FAT I test 
Dep. Variable t-
Statistic 




Dep. Variable: log (t-





SQR_SampleSize --- 0.004  
(0.009) 
 
Log(DegreesFreedom)  --- --- 0.332***  
(0.117)  






R2 0.0364 0,0053 0.0902 
F 2.95 0.20 8.06*** 
N 80 80 80 
Level of significance: **=5 per cent; ***=1 per cent 
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